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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines how banking market concentration affects small 
businesses finance. Using the Survey of Small Business Finance, the 
empirical model show that bank concentration may adversely affect the 
amount of credit supplied to small businesses. We find that bank 
concentration decreases the L/C limits of firms significantly, while 
there is no statistically significant difference in L/C balance across 
banking markets. We also show that bank concentration lowers the 
overall debt-to-asset ratio of small firms that includes loans from non-
bank institutions, suggesting that credit from non-bank institutions do 
not fully make up the effect of bank concentration. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Over the past few decades, improvements in information technology, financial 
deregulation has contributed to create a more competitive environment and have 
encouraged an unprecedented consolidation in the banking sector. In the U.S., M&A 
activity in the financial institution sector has reduced the number of banks by more than 
one-third until the end of the 1990s. Consolidation in the banking industry has raised 
concerns among policymakers that this may lead to a reduced availability of credit for 
small businesses, primarily due to the decrease in the number of small banks specialized 
in this type of lending. 
Empirical research on the effect of banking concentration on credit availability is 
relatively lacking and provides contradicting results. Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that 
small firms in concentrated banking markets are less credit-constrained by examining the 
use of trade credit and loan rates. Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) reinforced this view by 
showing that bank competition is less favorable to emergence of new firms. On the other 
hand, Cetorelli(2004) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) show that potential entrants face 
greater difficulty gaining access to credit in concentrated banking markets than those in 
competitive banking markets. Craig and Hardee(2007) also shows that small firms in 
areas dominated by large banks are less likely to hold debt and if they do hold debt, the 
level of debt-to-asset ratio is significantly lower. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic(2004), using international data, finds that bank concentration increases 
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financing obstacles, with stronger effect for small and medium firms. Also, several recent 
studies show that increased bank competition caused by deregulation had positive effects 
on various aspects of economy such as local economic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan 
1996), entrepreneurship (Black and Strahan, 2001) and business cycle volatility (Morgan, 
Rime, and Strahan, 2001). 
    One of great challenges in examining the effect of bank competition on credit access is 
the classical problem of identification: Researchers cannot always observe how much 
credit a firms needs and how much of that credit need is met by credit supply of banks. 
Since we can only observe the size of granted loans, researchers may not tell any 
observed difference in the size of granted loans is supply-constrained or demand-
constrained. To address this problem, we focus on a unique feature of lines of credit 
(L/Cs) that the maximum balance of an L/C that a bank allows (L/C limit) is usually 
different from actual balance of an L/C (L/C balance). Since borrowing firms pay interest 
only for the balance of L/C not for the whole limit, firms have little incentive to limit the 
size of L/C voluntarily. It is usually banks that set the limit based on various factors such 
as credit quality and length of relationships. Once L/C limit is set for a firm, however, 
how much the firm actually borrows (L/C balance) solely depends on the firm’s credit 
need. Therefore, L/C limit and L/C balance provides useful proxies for the maximum 
credit that a bank is willing to provide (credit supply) and credit need of a firm (credit 
demand), respectively. 
Using both OLS and Heckit model to correct for sample selection, we show that 
L/Cs granted by banks in concentrated markets have significantly lower limits than those 
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granted by banks in competitive banking markets, while there was no statistically 
significant differences in L/C balances. Underlying differences in firm and loan 
characteristics and regional/industrial characteristics across markets are carefully 
controlled for all the estimates and do not appear to explain our findings. Results remain 
consistent throughout robustness checks. We also show that small businesses in 
concentrated banking market has significantly lower debt-to-asset ratio. This result is 
consistent with Boot and Thakor (2000), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) 
and challenges the well-known findings of Peterson and Rajan (1995). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present data and 
describe our methodology used for hypothesis test. In the third section, our results are 
presented and we present and examine alternative explanations and measures. We also 
examine how banking market concentration affects the overall indebtedness of small 
firms. Finally, we conclude with suggestions for future research.  
 
2. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
The data in this study is obtained from the 2003 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances. The target population of the survey consists of U.S. domestic, non-farm, for 
profit, nonfinancial, nongovernmental small businesses with fewer than 500 employees 
that were in operation as of December 31, 2003. There are 4,240 total firms in the sample 
and out of them 1910 firms have at least one line-of-credit (L/C) from commercial banks.  
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One unique feature of 2003 data set is that it includes five implicates with each 
implicate including 4,240 firms. Past NSSBF data sets (published in 1987, 1993, 1998) 
calculates imputed values in the place of missing values and it raised some concerns 
about accuracy of those imputed values and their effect on estimates. To address this 
problem, 2003 NSSBF creates five different sets of imputed values for single missing 
values. Across those five implicates, the values of all reported variables remain constant, 
but only the values of imputed variables may differ. This allows us to obtain better 
estimates by adjusting the estimated standard errors and confidence intervals to account 
for the additional variance that imputation may cause. All of the estimates reported in this 
paper are calculated using Rubin (1987)’s method of combining estimates from five 
imputations.  
For a measure of the degree of bank competition in the market, we use the 
Herfindhal index of commercial bank deposit concentration as a proxy. NSSBF data 
reports only three broad categorization of the Herfindahl index: whether the Herfindahl 
index is less than 0.1, between 0.1 and 0.18, or greater than 0.18. One potential problem 
with this categorization is that the number of firms in the most competitive category 
(Herfindahl Index<0.1) is very small (n=129) compared to middle (n=881) and the most 
concentrated (n=900). So, we focus on the difference between the markets whose HHI is 
larger than 1.8 (we refer to the markets as concentrated markets) and other markets 
whose HHI is less than 1.8, which includes both the middle markets and the most 
competitive markets (we refer to the markets as competitive markets). This way, we can 
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compare two groups that fairly evenly divide the sample. The sample is described in 
Table 1. 
In order to investigate how bank competition affects the amount of bank credit 
offered to small firms, we analyze the effect of banking market concentration on L/C 
limit and L/C balance. One of great challenges of studying the effect of bank competition 
on credit supply is that we cannot always observe how much credit a firms needs and 
how much of that credit need is met by credit supply of banks. Since we can only observe 
how much loan is granted, even when we find a statistical correlation between bank 
competition and total bank loans used does not necessarily tell us whether the correlation 
is supply-driven by banks or demand-driven by borrowing firms. Though it is well known 
that small businesses are more likely to be credit constrained, that a firm in a 
concentrated banking market has less bank debt does not necessarily mean that the firm is 
more financially constrained.  
To address this problem, this paper focuses on the difference between L/C limit and 
L/C balance. One of unique features of L/Cs is that borrowers do not need to use the 
maximum credit balance that a bank allows and pay interests only for the used portion of 
the L/Cs. This feature creates different incentive for borrowing firms and banks. 
Obviously, borrowing firms have an incentive to secure L/Cs with highest possible limits 
for its current and future credit needs and also to secure a source of credit against future 
uncertainty. Banks, however, have to be very careful in granting L/Cs and in determining 
limits of the L/Cs based on creditworthiness of firms since it is a serious forward 
commitment for them. This probably is the reason why turndown rate of new L/C 
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application (21.6%) is much higher than that of other loans (6.9%).1 Once a L/C is 
granted and limit is determined to a firm, however, how much the firm actually borrows 
solely depends on the firm’s current credit need. This unique structure of L/Cs makes L/C 
balance a good proxy for the loan demand of a firm while L/C limit is more likely to be 
set by lenders. If banking market concentration makes banks to reduce credit supply to 
small businesses, then we should expect the L/C limits in the concentrated markets to be 
smaller while the amount of L/C balance is relatively unaffected by banking market 
structure. 
One potential problem that we have to deal with when we use L/C limit, L/C balance 
distinction is that L/C balance is constrained by the L/C limit and therefore might be 
correlated with L/C limit. If a statistical correlation between bank concentration and the 
amount of bank credit granted is supply driven, then L/C limit should more closely reflect 
the correlation and it will affect L/C balance only indirectly. If the correlation is driven 
by small firms’ credit needs, then it should be reflected by L/C balance and only to a 
lesser degree by L/C limit. Therefore, we should focus both on the magnitude and 
strength of statistical correlation between bank concentration and L/C limit and L/C 
balance.   
NSSBF reports both limits and balances of L/Cs for 1656 firms that have one or 
more L/Cs from its primary L/C bank.2 Also, there are 275 firms have L/Cs from more 
                                                 
1 According to Most Recent Loan variables of NSSBF 2003 data, there was 1347 total loan application and 
291 of them was new L/C applications. Out of 291 new L/C applications 63 applications are turned down. 
In case of all the other 1056 loan applications, only 73 applications are turned down. 
2 Since we focus on the effect of banking market concentration on L/C variables, L/Cs issued by non-bank 
financial institutions are excluded from the sample. 
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than one banks (229 firms from two banks 46 from three or more banks). For these firms, 
we calculated the sum of limits and balances of all the L/Cs that they have. We call the 
former (limits and balances of L/Cs from primary L/C bank) as primary L/C variables 
and the latter as total L/C variables.  
A major advantage of using primary L/C variables as dependent variables is that it is 
based on one firm-one bank relationship. This allows us to controls for the firm-bank 
relationship and terms and conditions of the L/C such as the length of relationship and the 
distance between a firm and its primary L/C bank, financial services – checking, saving 
account and cash management, transaction and credit service - that the firm use from its 
primary L/C bank and types of collateral used to secure the L/C.  Therefore, for baseline 
regressions, we focus on primary L/C variables. Then in the following section, we check 
whether the outcome changes when we use total L/C variables and primary L/C variables 
as a share of assets as dependent variables.  
When we checked the univariate regression of L/C limits and L/C balance, estimates 
in Table 2 show that L/C limits in concentrated banking market is about 24% smaller and 
the difference is statistically significant at 1% (t = 2.76). When we divide the sample into 
young (firm age≤14) and old firms (firm age>14) using the median age of 14 years, the 
differences in L/C limit is more pronounced in young firms sample at about 42% (t = 
3.17), compared to old firm sample in which the difference is much smaller and 
insignificant. The amount of L/C balance did not display significant difference across 
banking market structure but the coefficients are negative and only slightly smaller in 
magnitude.  
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To examine the topic in a more thorough manner, we perform multivariate 
regressions with L/C limit and L/C balance as separate dependent variables. Regression 
equation has the following generic form: 
 
          Ln(Li) = iiii uxAgecLnbHa ++++ β)(                                      
        Ln(Ui) = iiii uxAgecLnbHa ++++ β)(                           (1)           
 
where Ln(Li) is the log value of L/C limit of a firm i, Ln(Ui) is the log value of L/C 
balance of a firm i, Hi is a dummy variable for concentrated market, Ln(Agei ) is a log 
value of firm i’s age in years. xi  is a vector of other possible exogenous influences on 
indebtedness (withβ  its vector of estimated coefficients) and ui is the random error.   
In addition to this standard model, we will also explore the possibility that banking 
market structure might affect firms’ access to L/Cs, using Heckman two-step model that 
examines the level of L/C limits and balances conditional on access to L/Cs.   
Our model contains many control variables that might affect L/C variables to ensure 
that banking market structure variable does not pick up extraneous elements that would 
bias the results. We control for various aspects of firm, owner, and firm-bank relationship 
characteristics: When regarding firm characteristics, book value of asset, total sales and 
number of employees (all in log form) are used to control for the effect of firm size. In 
case of the firm’s age (in log form), we expect a negative coefficient because young firms 
need more credit to establish their business than do older, more established firms. We 
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also added controls for sales changes compared to the last fiscal year,3 its D&B credit 
ranking and its organizational form such as proprietorship and corporation. Owner 
variables include the weighted average of the owners’ education, years of experience and 
the natural log of the wealth of the primary owner, including the value of the owner’s 
home. We also added controls for African-American ownership because many studies 
(Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman, 2003; Cavalluzzo and Volken, 2005) find that 
blacks have limited access to credit markets. Bank-firm relationship variables include the 
length of relationship and physical distance between the firm and the bank and dummy 
variables for use of various financial services such as checking, saving and cash 
management services that Cole (1998) found important in firm-bank relationships. Also, 
we added controls for whether collateral is used to secure the L/C and for the types of 
collateral used. Lastly, to control for regional and industry level differences, we added 
dummy variables for census region, MSA status (the only two geographical identifiers 
available) and 1-digit SIC codes.  
 
3. Bank Concentration, L/C limit and L/C balance  
 
3.1 Baseline Results 
Our estimates from Eq.(1) appear in Table 3.  
                                                 
3 Unlike past waves of NSSBF data sets, 2003 data does not report the sales or profit of previous fiscal 
year. Instead, it asks firms whether the sales or profit has grown, decreased, been the same compared to the 
previous year or firm did not operate during the previous year. 
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First, estimates support our key assumption that L/C limit is a proxy for credit supply 
while L/C balance reflects credit need of a firm. For example, the coefficient of credit 
rating variable is positive and significant in L/C Limit regressions, while it is negative 
and significant in L/C balance regressions. It means that firms with better credit ratings 
secure higher L/C limits while they actually use less L/C credits. We believe this is the 
case because banks offer higher L/C limits to firms with better credit ratings while it is 
the firms with bad credit rating that are in more dire need for credit. Personal wealth of 
owner variable also shows a similar pattern. While owner wealth has positive effect on 
L/C limit, suggesting that banks will offer higher L/C limits to firms with wealthier 
owner, it does not show any significant effect on L/C balance and the coefficient 
becomes negative.  
Another interesting variable is the number of financial institutions related. It is well 
documented that banks do not prefer firms that have relationship with multiple banks. 
Therefore, given our assumption that L/C limit is determined by banks, it is expected that 
the variable has a negative and significant coefficient on L/C limits (in column I). 
Interestingly, however, it has an opposite effect on L/C balance (in column III). The 
positive and significant coefficient, we believe, stems from that firms with more credit 
needs would try multiple financial institutions to fill their credit demand, supporting our 
assumption that L/C balance is a proxy for credit demand.    
Second, estimates in column I show that L/C limits of firms in concentrated banking 
markets are smaller than ones in competitive banking markets. The difference is 
statistically significant at 1% and is economically meaningful. Taken literally, being in a 
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concentrated banking market is associated with 14% smaller L/C limit. In case of the L/C 
balance, however, banking market structure did not have any significant effect. As which 
we can see in column III, the coefficient of concentrated market dummy is statistically 
insignificant and is much smaller in magnitude. It is worth noting that the negative 
coefficient of concentrated banking market dummy is expected given the fact that the 
amount of L/C balance is ultimately limited by L/C limit.  
One potential problem with focusing on L/C is that there might be a selection bias if 
there is correlation between bank concentration and loan turndown rate. Park (2007), 
using the same data set, finds that the banks in concentrated banking markets are more 
likely to reject loans, especially L/Cs. In this case, average quality of firms with L/Cs in 
the concentrated market might be better than that of firms in competitive market, which 
may affect the limits of L/Cs granted. To deal with this problem, we use Heckman two-
step model for our regressions.4  Estimates from Heckman regressions are reported in 
column II and IV of Table 3.  
In the column II, the coefficient of inverse Mills ratio in L/C limit regression is 
statistically significant, which confirms the presence of selection bias and therefore 
justifies the use of Heckman selection model. In case of L/C balance regressions, 
however, we do not find evidence of selection bias; inverse Mills ratio is not statistically 
significant.  
Correcting for sample selection makes a couple of interesting changes. First, the 
bank concentration effect on L/C limits became stronger after the correction while its 
                                                 
4 Probit estimates on having an L/C (the first step of Heckit) are reported in Appendix.  
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effect on L/C balance becomes even smaller. When all the other things are equal, L/C 
limits in concentrated banking market are about 25% smaller than those in competitive 
markets.  Coefficient of black ownership variable also shows an interesting change. Its 
OLS estimate has a positive sign, which is unexpected given well documented racial 
discrimination against blacks in small business lending. Once we correct for selection 
bias, however, the coefficient becomes negative, though it is not statistically significant.5 
Another interesting variable is the number of financial institutions related. While the 
coefficient on L/C limit is negative in the baseline OLS regression, its Heckit coefficient 
becomes positive and significant at 1%. It is because firms with multiple banking 
relationships are much more likely to have at least one L/C. Therefore, after correcting 
for selection bias, the number of banks that a firm has relationship with may have a 
positive effect on L/C limit. 
To summarize, after controlling for underlying differences in firm and loan 
characteristics and regional/industrial characteristics across markets, we find that banking 
market concentration lowers L/C limit significantly but it does not seem to affect the 
amount of L/C balance. This result discount the possibility that lower L/C limit in 
concentrated banking market is demand driven.  
 
3.2. Robustness Checks 
                                                 
5 Another interesting change is that the number of financial institutions that a firm has relationship with has 
a negative and significant coefficient on L/C limit in OLS regressions but in Heckman regression 
coefficient becomes positive and significant at 1%. It is well documented that banks do not favor firms that 
have relationship with multiple banks but at the same time firms with multiple banking relationships are 
more likely to have at least one L/C. Therefore, after correcting for selection bias, the number of banks that 
a firm has relationship with may have a positive effect on L/C limit. 
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In order to ensure robustness of our estimates, we run a series of additional 
regressions with additional control variable to the model. Since baseline regression 
results show the evidence of selection bias, we use two-step Heckit for all the regressions 
from below.  
First, several papers surveyed in the previous section expect bank concentration may 
have stronger effect on young firms. To investigate this possibility, we first divide the 
sample using median firm age of 14 years. Estimates from young and old firm samples 
are reported in the second and the third column of Table 4, respectively. It shows that 
bank concentration effect on both L/C limit and L/C balance is stronger among young 
firms than older firms. Taken literally, among young firms, being in concentrated 
banking market means about 29% smaller L/C limits while among old firms it means 
about 19% lower limits. In case of L/C balances, bank concentration effect is negative 
among young firms but becomes positive but neither of them is statistically significant.  
Second, we need to consider a possibility that the correlation between bank 
competition and the urban/rural location of the firm may drive the baseline results. In the 
sample, all the young firms in the most competitive market are located is urban area, 
while 34 percent of firms in concentrated markets are in rural areas. Therefore, a potential 
connection between urban/rural location and the use of bank debt may cause a spurious 
correlation between bank concentration and the use of bank credit. To address this 
concern, we limit the sample to urban firms and repeat the baseline regression. As we can 
see in the fourth column of the Table 4, the estimates from the urban firm sample are 
consistent with those in baseline regressions: The most concentrated market dummy is 
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still statistically significant in L/C limit regression and the magnitude of the bank 
concentration effect slightly increases, suggesting that the connection between bank 
concentration and urban/rural location does not explain our findings. In case of L/C 
balance, the coefficient becomes much bigger in magnitude but it still remains 
insignificant. 
Another potential problem we need to consider is that the captured bank 
concentration effect was driven by differences in investment opportunities across banking 
markets. For example, in areas where the local economy is booming, more banks may 
open up more branches and de novo banks may enter the bank market, which may create 
a positive association between investment opportunity (thus, loan demand) and bank 
competition. For a test on the investment opportunities, we created the ‘industry (1 digit 
SIC code) x division’ dummy variables, to use in place of separate industry and census 
region dummies. This creates indicators for each industry (1 digit SIC code) in each 
census region, generating 81 dummy variables. Still, the concentration coefficient 
reported in fifth column of Table 4 decreased only slightly and remains statistically 
significant at 1%.6 In case of L/C balance, the coefficient of concentrated market dummy 
becomes positive, suggesting firms may borrow more despite lower L/C limits in 
concentrated banking markets though the difference is statistically insignificant. 
One final check that we need to make is a connection between L/C limit and L/C 
balance. Though they are not statistically significant, the coefficients of concentrated 
market dummy are still negative in many regressions. It may well be driven by the low 
                                                 
6 We also tried 2 digit SIC code instead of industry x division dummies and the results are still consistent 
with baseline regressions. 
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limits of L/Cs in concentrated markets but it may also be a reflection of relatively less 
demand for credit. To address the problem of L/C limit and L/C balance connection, in a 
more rigorous manner, we added L/C balance as an additional control variable for L/C 
limit regression to get the effect of bank concentration on L/C limit when the L/C balance 
is given. Estimates in the last column show that the addition of L/C balance has no effect 
on bank concentration coefficient. The coefficient is almost identical to that of baseline 
regression and statistically significant at 1%, while as expected, the L/C balance has 
significant positive correlation with L/C limit. When we do the same in L/C balance 
regression by adding L/C limit as a control variable, coefficient of the concentrated 
banking market dummy becomes positive. It suggests that given the L/C limit, firms in 
the concentrated market may use more credit than similar firms in competitive markets 
but the difference is statistically insignificant.  
To summarize, even after controlling for differences in urban-rural area and in 
investment opportunities, our findings appears to be robust: Firms in the most 
concentrated banking markets get significantly less credit from banks while credit 
demand of firms do not seem to differ across banking markets. Moreover, L/C limits in 
concentrated banking market tend to smaller even when the L/C balance is given, further 
discounting that our finding is driven by differences in credit demand across banking 
markets.  
 
3.3. Alternative L/C variables 
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As we noted earlier, there are 275 firms have L/Cs from more than one banks. Since 
primary L/C is not the only source of L/Cs for these firms, to capture the impact of 
banking market concentration on overall credit availability we need to calculated the sum 
of limits and balances of all the L/Cs that they have, which we define as total L/C 
variables. When we use logarithmized total L/C variables as dependent variables, we 
cannot control for types of collateral that a firm posted to secure each L/Cs nor can we 
control for firm-bank relationship variables for each bank that granted L/Cs to the firm. 
Instead, we added ‘total number of collateral’ that a firm used for all the L/Cs and used 
relationship variables between firm and primary L/C bank.7  
Using total L/C variables as dependent variable, we replicate baseline regression and 
all the robustness checks of Table 4 and summarize them in Table 5. As we can see from 
the estimates, results from total L/C regressions are consistent with and very similar in 
magnitude to those of primary L/C regressions. Bank concentration effect does not 
depend on the number of L/Cs or the number of banks from which a firm gets L/Cs.  
Another alternative set of L/C variables are ‘L/C ratio’ which is the ratio of L/C 
variables and total asset of a firm. If firms in concentrated bank markets are smaller due 
to credit constraints, then it may also affect the average size of L/Cs. Using ‘L/C ratio’ 
should be able to fix this potential problem. When we calculate the ratio, however, we 
face a small number of observations with unusually high value for the ratio, mostly due to 
unusually small reported book value of assets. To suppress the effect of these outliers, we 
use logarithmized vale of the ratio and eliminate observations whose L/C limit or L/C 
                                                 
7 Whether we include firm-bank relationship variables or not did not change the quantitative nor qualitative 
outcome of our findings. 
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balance is more than five times bigger than its assets.8 Table 6 summarizes the estimates 
from alternative dependent variable regressions. Again, results are very similar to those 
of primary L/C and total L/C regressions. One key difference is that L/C balance ratio 
seems to be lower in concentrated banking market and the difference is statistically 
significant at 1%. While this may provide evidence that there is significant difference in 
credit demand across banking markets, the magnitude of the difference is far smaller than 
that of L/C balance ratio. For example, in the baseline regressions, L/C limit ratio is about 
37% lower in concentrated banking market while the difference in L/C balance is only 
about 5%. So, it seems that the lower L/C balance ratio is not strong enough to explain 
the differences in L/C limit ratio. 
 
3.4. Bank Concentration and Overall Indebtedness of Small Businesses 
The results presented so far suggest that the banking market structure plays an 
important role in supplying credit to small businesses while credit demand does not seem 
to be affected by credit market. In this section, we examine how banking market structure 
affects the overall indebtedness of small businesses. By including all the loans from both 
bank and non-bank institutions, we examine whether small firms utilizes non-bank 
institutions such as credit unions and S&Ls to make up for the shortage of bank-issued 
credits that we find in the previous sections.  
                                                 
8 47 observations are excluded from the sample for L/C limit ratio regressions and 20 for L/C balance ratio 
regressions.  Whether we include these observations or not did not alter the quantitative or qualitative 
outcome of our findings. 
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For this test, we explore the effect of banking market concentration on logarithmized 
total debt-to-asset ratio conditional on debt access using Heckman two-step regressions. 
We include all the control variables that we used for total L/C regressions to ensure that 
the concentrated market dummy do not reflect spurious correlation that would bias the 
results. Our estimates from this regression appear in Table 7.9 The coefficient of the 
concentrated banking market dummy, which captures the difference in total debt-to-asset 
ratio of firms across banking markets, is negative and statistically significant at 5%. The 
effect is also economically meaningful: Firms in concentrated banking markets start out 
with more than 10 percent lower bank debt-to-asset ratio.  
Estimates in Table 6 also show that the bank concentration effect is not driven by 
differences urban-rural location (column 2) of firms or investment opportunities (column 
3). They also show that the bank concentration effect is stronger among young firms 
(column 4) compared to older firms (column 5).   
This finding is consistent with our findings in the previous sections and also suggests 
that loans from non-bank institutions are not enough to make up for the shortage of bank-
issued credit to small businesses in concentrated markets.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We find that market concentration in the commercial banking industry may reduce 
the amount of credit supplied to small businesses in the area. Small businesses, especially 
                                                 
9 Probit estimates on taking on debt (the first step of Heckit) are reported in Appendix. Interestingly, probit 
results show that firms in concentrated banking markets are significantly less likely to have any debt.  
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young firms in concentrated banking markets have significantly less amount of bank debt 
and much lower bank debt-to-asset ratio, compared to similar firms in competitive 
banking markets. Moreover, using a unique distinction between L/C limit and L/C 
balance, we show that the bank concentration effect is driven by banks, not by varying 
loan demands of firms across banking markets.  
Our findings directly challenge the findings of Petersen and Rajan (1995). We could 
not find any evidence that banking market concentration might be beneficial to young 
and small firms in the area. Rather, empirical evidence in this paper is consistent with 
recent studies such as Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic(2004), Cetorelli and 
Strahan(2006) and Craig and Hardee(2007) that emphasize the benefits of increased bank 
competition and banking market deregulation. The policy implications of our finding, 
therefore, should also be in line with these studies.  
The theoretical implications of our finding on relationship banking are not as clear. It 
may simply mean that the market concentration is not a good predictor of relationship 
banking. Banks in concentrated markets may not provide L/Cs to young firms simply 
because they are not interested in relationship banking, while banks in competitive 
markets engage in relationship banking more actively for the reasons that Boot and 
Thakor (2000) articulate. If this is the case, the connection between the banking market 
concentration and relationship banking practice needs to be questioned. Alternatively, it 
may also signify that banks in concentrated markets are a different breed of relationship 
bank: they are more concerned about protecting their existing relationships rather than 
creating new ones, as Cestone and White (2003) modeled.  
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Discriminating these two competing hypotheses is impossible based on our findings 
in this study but it would make a good topic for future research. Also, it would be 
interesting to investigate whether or not bank size causes institutions to react differently 
to changes in banking market structure. If bank size is in fact an important contributor to 
bank behavior, it would be interesting to see how they differ.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Firms Classified by Age and Credit Market Structure* 
Variable Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
LnLC_Limit_Prime Logarithmized limits of L/Cs from primary L/C bank 12.078 1.866
LnLC_Balance_Prime Logarithmized balance of L/Cs from primary L/C bank 7.331 5.704
LnLC_Limit_Total Logarithmized limits of All L/Cs that a firm has 12.194 1.881
LnLC_Balance_Total Logarithmized balance of All L/Cs that a firm has 7.598 5.696
LnLC_Limit_Prime_Ratio Logarithmized limit of primary L/Cs as a share of assets -1.322 1.354
LnLC_Balance_Prime_Ratio Logarithmized balance of Primary L/Cs as a share of assets 0.171 0.342
  
CONTROL VARIABLES  
Concentrated Market Banking Market Concentration (Herfindahl Index) is larger than 1.8: (0,1) 
Logarithmized Value of Assets Logarithmized value of assets 13.353 2.333
Logarithmized Total Sales Logarithmized value of sales 14.444 2.009
Logarithmized Total Employees Logarithmized total number of employees 3.075 1.427
Profit Rate Profit as a share of assets 0.060 1.556
Logarithmized Firm Age  Logarithmized age of firm in years 2.626 0.850
D&B Credit Score D&B credit score of a firm: 1–6, 1 = worst, 6 = best 4.064 1.459
Owner Experience Weighted average number of years of experience of owners 0.231 0.110
Owner Education Weighted average education level of owners 4.797 1.832
Share Owned by Black Weighted percent of ownership that is black  0.016 0.119
Logarithmized Owner’s Wealth Logarithmized value of primary owner’s net worth 0.831 0.733
# of Financial Institutions Related  Number of financial institutions that firm has relationship with 3.432 2.058
# of Lines of Credit Number of L/Cs firm has from its primary L/C bank 1.132 0.425
Length of Relationship with Bank Logarithmized length of relationship with primary L/C bank in months 4.506 1.039
Distance from the Bank Logarithmized distance from the primary L/C bank in miles 1.595 1.297
MSA Status  Firm is located in MSA: dummy variable (0,1) 0.792 0.406
Proprietorship Firms is sole proprietorship: (0,1) 0.141 0.348
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Corporation Firm is corporation: (0,1) 0.761 0.427
Checking Account Firm has a checking account from the primary L/C bank: (0,1) 0.904 0.295
Transaction Service Firm used transaction service from the primary L/C bank: (0,1) 0.536 0.499
Credits Service Firm used credit service from the primary L/C bank: (0,1) 0.129 0.335
Saving Account Firm has a savings account from the primary L/C bank: (0,1) 0.232 0.423
Cash Service Firm used cash service from the primary L/C bank: (0,1) 0.240 0.427
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Table 2. Univariate Regression 
 L/C Limits L/C balance 
All Firms   
               Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.248** -0.209 
 (0.090) (0.262) 
               Observations 1910 1910 
Young Firms   
               Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.424** -0.401 
 (0.134) (0.372) 
               Observations 851 851 
Old Firms   
               Concentrated Market (0,1) -0.134 -0.046 
 (0.117) (0.369) 
               Observations 1059 1059 
Dependent variable is logarithmized limits of L/Cs from primary L/C bank for column I and 
logarithmized balances of L/Cs from primary L/C bank for column II. 
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
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Table 3. Baseline Regression on Bank Concentration and L/C Limits and L/C balance  
 L/C Limit L/C balance 
 OLS Heckit OLS Heckit  
Natural Log of Book Value of Assets 0.178 0.266 0.125 0.087 
 (0.021)** (0.024)** (0.117) (0.137) 
Natural Log of Total Sales 0.376 0.642 0.085 -0.028 
 (0.032)** (0.049)** (0.184) (0.282) 
Natural Log of Total Employees 0.059 0.041 -0.251 -0.244 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.197) (0.198) 
Profit Rate -0.055 -0.046 0.035 0.031 
 (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.089) (0.089) 
Concentrated Bank Market (0,1)   -0.141 -0.255 -0.063 -0.014 
 (0.055)** (0.056)** (0.310) (0.324) 
Natural Log of Firm Age in Years -0.076 -0.064 -0.176 -0.181 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.243) (0.243) 
D&B Credit Score 0.043 0.112 -0.658 -0.687 
 (0.018)* (0.020)** (0.102)** (0.116)** 
Owner Experience 0.424 0.224 1.094 1.178 
 (0.303) (0.299) (1.688) (1.696) 
Owner Education 0.038 0.056 0.091 0.083 
 (0.015)* (0.015)** (0.087) (0.088) 
Share Owned by Black 0.232 -0.193 1.935 2.115 
 (0.212) (0.219) (1.193) (1.243) 
Natural Log of Owner’s Wealth 0.332 0.258 -0.025 0.006 
 (0.045)** (0.046)** (0.254) (0.260) 
# of Financial Institutions Related   -0.027 0.112 0.218 0.159 
 (0.013)* (0.023)** (0.075)** (0.135) 
# of Lines of Credit  0.385 0.386 1.979 1.979 
 (0.058)** (0.057)** (0.331)** (0.331)** 
Length of Relationship with Bank -0.034 -0.042 -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.156) (0.156) 
Distance from the Bank 0.056 0.048 0.269 0.272 
 (0.021)** (0.020)* (0.118)* (0.118)* 
MSA Status (0,1) -0.052 0.008 -0.149 -0.174 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.382) (0.386) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  2.570  -1.089 
  (0.359)**  (2.078) 
Observations 1656 1656 1656 1656 
R-squared 0.76 0.77 0.18 0.18 
Notes: The dependent variable is a natural log sum of the L/C limit and the amount of L/Cs a firm has used. 
The regression also includes nine industry dummy variables, eight regional dummy variables, dummies for 
collateral types and financial services – checking and savings account, cash management, transaction, 
credit service - and an intercept, except for column 3 where division x 1-digit SIC is used. Standard errors 
appear in parentheses. 
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
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Table 4. Robustness Check for Baseline Regressions  
 Baseline Urban Div*Sic Young Old  Conditional 
L/C PRIME LIMIT       
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.570 2.746 2.576 2.735 2.366 2.616 
 (0.359)** (0.418)** (0.368)** (0.579)** (0.494)** (0.349)** 
Concentrated Bank Market (0,1)   -0.255 -0.289 -0.240 -0.293 -0.196 -0.255 
 (0.056)** (0.060)** (0.057)** (0.091)** (0.073)** (0.054)** 
Natural Log of Firm Age -0.064 -0.073 -0.044 -0.057 0.166 -0.057 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.043) (0.077) (0.111) (0.041) 
Logarithmized Primary L/C Balance      0.042 
      (0.005)** 
Observations 1656 1311 1656 729 927 1656 
R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.78 0.78 
L/C PRIME USED       
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.089 -0.049 -1.831 -0.568 -1.582 -4.730 
 (2.078) (2.474) (2.143) (3.149) (3.012) (2.060)* 
Concentrated Bank Market (0,1)   -0.014 -0.201 0.101 -0.161 0.217  0.347 
 (0.324) (0.357) (0.333) (0.501) (0.443) (0.317) 
Natural Log of Firm Age -0.181 -0.234 -0.172 -0.035 -0.645 -0.090 
 (0.243) (0.275) (0.251) (0.433) (0.706) (0.237) 
Logarithmized Primary L/C Limit      1.417 
      (0.156)** 
Observations 1656 1311 1656 729 927 1656 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.23 
Notes: The dependent variable is a natural log sum of the L/C limit and the amount of L/Cs a firm has used. The regression also includes nine industry 
dummy variables, eight regional dummy variables, dummies for collateral types and financial services – checking and savings account, cash 
management, transaction, credit service - and an intercept, except for column 3 where division x 1-digit SIC is used. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses. 
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
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Table 5. Total L/C Variable Regressions 
 All Urban Div_Sic Young Old Conditional 
TOTAL L/C LIMIT       
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.527 2.872 2.550 3.121 2.123 2.514 
 (0.354)** (0.410)** (0.363)** (0.571)** (0.481)** (0.343)** 
Concentrated Bank Market (0,1)   -0.232 -0.260 -0.230 -0.306 -0.165 -0.228 
 (0.054)** (0.059)** (0.056)** (0.088)** (0.071)* (0.053)** 
Natural Log of Firm Age -0.054 -0.052 -0.037 -0.041 0.208 -0.048 
 (0.036) (0.041) (0.037) (0.060) (0.109) (0.035) 
Logarithmized Total L/C Balance      0.042 
      (0.004)** 
Observations 1656 1311 1656 729 927 1656 
R-squared 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.79 
TOTAL L/C BALANCE       
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.303 1.036 -0.262 1.622 -0.440 -3.220 
 (2.006) (2.402) (2.067) (3.045) (2.916) (1.984) 
Concentrated Bank Market (0,1)   -0.099 -0.125 -0.028 -0.191 0.017 0.225 
 (0.312) (0.346) (0.319) (0.474) (0.430) (0.305) 
Natural Log of Firm Age -0.151 -0.137 -0.169 0.025 -0.567 -0.076 
 (0.209) (0.239) (0.214) (0.329) (0.688) (0.203) 
Logarithmized Total L/C Limit      1.394 
      (0.148)** 
Observations 1656 1311 1656 729 927 1656 
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.23 
Notes: The dependent variable is a natural log sum of limits and balances of all the L/Cs that a firm has. The regression also includes nine industry 
dummy variables, eight regional dummy variables, dummies for collateral types and financial services – checking and savings account, cash 
management, transaction, credit service - and an intercept, except for column 3 where division x 1-digit SIC is used. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses. 
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
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Table 6. Primary L/C variables as a share of assets 
 All Urban Division*sic Young Old Conditional 
PRIMARY L/C LIMIT/ASSET       
Inverse Mills Ratio 5.252 5.345 5.332 5.832 5.189 5.360 
 (0.390)** (0.462)** (0.403)** (0.638)** (0.520)** (0.383)** 
Concentrated Bank Market (0,1)   -0.375 -0.411 -0.369 -0.459 -0.286 -0.380 
 (0.065)** (0.069)** (0.067)** (0.108)** (0.083)** (0.063)** 
Natural Log of Firm Age -0.079 -0.099 -0.075 -0.008 0.016 -0.073 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.050) (0.090) (0.127) (0.047) 
Logarithmized Primary L/C Balance      0.036 
      (0.005)** 
Observations 1609 1271 1609 703 906 1609 
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.31 
PRIMARY L/C BALANCE/ASSET       
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.645 0.661 0.620 0.650 0.744 0.636 
 (0.085)** (0.104)** (0.088)** (0.148)** (0.107)** (0.082)** 
Concentrated Bank Market (0,1)   -0.053 -0.058 -0.050 -0.053 -0.048 -0.043 
 (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.025)* (0.017)** (0.013)** 
Natural Log of Firm Age -0.009 -0.015 -0.009 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.026) (0.010) 
Logarithmized Primary L/C Limit      0.068 
      (0.006)** 
Observations 1636 1293 1636 716 920 1636 
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.27 
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithmized limits and balances of L/Cs from primary L/C bank as a share of assets. The regression also includes 
nine industry dummy variables, eight regional dummy variables, dummies for collateral types and financial services – checking and savings account, 
cash management, transaction, credit service - and an intercept, except for column 3 where division x 1-digit SIC is used. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses. 
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
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     Table 7. Robustness Checks on the Effect of Bank Concentration on Small Business Indebtedness 
 All Urban Div_sic Young Old 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.868 -0.888 -0.847 -1.226 -0.505 
 (0.359)* (0.423)* (0.364)* (0.549)* (0.471) 
Concentrated Bank Market (0,1)   -0.103 -0.100 -0.102 -0.143 -0.065 
 (0.046)* (0.051) (0.046)* (0.069)* (0.061) 
Natural Log of Firm Age -0.139 -0.139 -0.144 -0.156 -0.146 
 (0.038)** (0.044)** (0.038)** (0.065)* (0.092) 
Observations 3866 3058 3866 1943 1923 
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.10 
Notes: The dependent variable is a natural log of total debt-to-asset ratio. The regression also includes nine industry dummy variables, eight regional 
dummy variables, dummies for financial services – checking and savings account, cash management, transaction, credit service - and an intercept, 
except for column 3 where division x 1-digit SIC is used. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
** Coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, * coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
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Appendix. Probit Regression Estimates on having Debt and L/C 
 Have Any Debt (0,1) Have an L/C (0,1) 
Natural Log of Book Value of Assets 0.023 0.058 
 (0.013) (0.014)** 
Natural Log of Total Sales 0.193 0.182 
 (0.019)** (0.019)** 
Profit Rate -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Concentrated Bank Market (0,1)   -0.109 -0.093 
 (0.049)* (0.049) 
Natural Log of Firm Age in Years -0.111 0.008 
 (0.033)** (0.032) 
D&B Credit Score -0.077 0.045 
 (0.017)** (0.016)** 
Owner Experience 0.438 -0.209 
 (0.256) (0.254) 
Owner Education -0.014 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Share Owned by Black -0.105 -0.212 
 (0.130) (0.149) 
Natural Log of Owner’s Wealth -0.168 -0.061 
 (0.043)** (0.041) 
MSA Status (0,1) 0.132 0.057 
 (0.059)* (0.058) 
Sole Proprietorship (0,1) -0.300 -0.011 
 (0.081)** (0.084) 
Corporation (0,1) 0.129 0.127 
 (0.076) (0.075) 
Checking Account (0,1) -0.031 0.199 
 (0.128) (0.168) 
Savings Account (0,1) 0.001 -0.131 
 (0.051) (0.050)** 
Transaction Service (0,1) 0.199 0.146 
 (0.047)** (0.046)** 
Cash Management Service (0,1) -0.127 0.067 
 (0.074) (0.070) 
Credit Management Service (0,1) 0.324 0.395 
 (0.095)** (0.085)** 
Trust Service (0,1) 0.028 0.146 
 (0.060) (0.057)** 
Brokerage Service (0,1) -0.128 -0.062 
 (0.085) (0.084) 
Observations 4240 4240 
Pseudo R2  0.16 0.19 
 
 
